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Discussion of Falun Gong

2007-09-29 Author:By: Zixian Deng & Shi-min Fang

By: Zixian Deng, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
Shi-min Fang, Ph.D. in Biochemistry

Revised May 31, 2000
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Annual Conference of The American Family Foundation (April 28-29, 2000) in Seattle, WA
Equal authors listed in alphabetical order

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We have so far painstakingly documented the central doctrines and behaviors of Falun Gong. Had the Falun Gong leader been a little bit more forth coming in their theories, or the message been a little bit more consistent, or the disciples and Li's representatives be a little bit less evasive, we could had saved the previous space but a single page and proceeded with our discussion on the necessary relation between the freedom of expression and critical thinking. We emphasize this problem in the context of the so-called Internet age and rapid communities in cyberspace. We believe that a broadly defined open society should be protected not only from the government's intrusion on the individual rights, but also from the vocal and aggressive collectivities - spiritual or secular - manipulating political institutions and deceiving the public. In this aspect, politics are necessarily involved.

Falun Gong pioneered a radical movement through "traditional" spiritual methods with innovative communication networks. It is the first mass based cult built on a network of personal contacts and remote controls via telephones, fax, and instant mass communication through Internet and the direct electronic anonymous communications it provided. No other group has succeeded as Falun Gong did in using three sophisticated layers of communication tools to exert control on the activities and the mind of the disciples with such efficiency.

Cult observers and monitors are often challenged not only by the theological disputes or the lack of prior legal constraint as the laws are enforced here, but also by the difficult balance between the moral demand to condemn irresponsible and immoral behaviors - such as deception and suppression of individual freedom - and the liberal doctrine of freedom of expression. Libertarians who treat the activities such as Falun Gong as purely a matter of freedom of beliefs and consciences, therefore their individual and collective behaviors should be protected. It becomes more so when the protected are considered as the weak, the oppressed and the prosecuted. In this, Falun Gong has played an outstanding role portraying itself as the embodiment of traditional Chinese culture and virtues, contrary to the disadvantages Schechter (2000) identifies with Falun Gong. As critics of cults, we must satisfy their demand by demonstrating that such freedom and liberties are only realistic within a range of choices. To use a popular phrase: one's freedom ends where it meets other's freedom.

Is Falun Gong Part of Chinese Traditional Culture?

This question is often raised in the defense of multiculturalism. Its position is, when some forms of expressions from other cultures are introduced into the host society, it enriches the contents of the host culture (see Kelly, D. 2000. for a discussion of the five different modes of interactions, cf. Kukathas, C. 1998. for the possible conflicts among the groups). Therefore, our first discussion deals with the positioning of Falun Gong in the Chinese and/or Buddhist culture.

Falun Gong insists on being, or is accepted by the western media as, a part of the Chinese tradition, blending Buddhism, Daoism and Mysticism. Is it part of the Chinese Tradition? The simple answer to this question is affirmative, but the question is: which part? We have not claimed that all traditions are wise or all traditional practices are helpful to current problems. Some practices disappeared (such as the "rain prayers") because we have better explanations for their causalities, other are eliminated because of gradual emphasis of humanistic values in the history. In the Chinese history, some "traditions" are even considered cruel thousands of years ago, reflecting a critical humanist element in its culture (Confucius himself started this tradition by decrying the practice of imitation human sacrifices). In Falun Gong, the humanist tradition is absent - humans are at the bottom of the despicable state and will be destroyed totally, eventually and regardless. Evidences do not support Falun Gong as part of the Confucian tradition no matter what labels it has adopted.

Another major claim on tradition by Li is that Falun Dafa being the whole of Buddhism, while other Buddhist schools belong to the minor part of the whole - less than ten percent. Furthermore, Li claims that even the Buddha did not represent the completeness of Buddhism. He did not or is unable to reveal the Falun Paradise, a clear indication of deficiencies. In the recent years, Buddhists have strongly disputed Falun Gong as part of Buddhism. They found the Falun Gong doctrines incompatible with the Buddha's teaching such as the in the use of medicine, human as equals in Buddha-nature, and the importance of compassion (Chen 1998; Zhao 1999; Beizhi 1999). Daoists also question the "belonging" of Falun Gong. Qigong (a surrogate of Daoism) masters including Yan Xin have not recognized Falun Gong as Qigong. In fact, Li himself denied being part of the Qigong schools. What tradition, then, is Falun Gong? Judging from the folklore storytelling in Falun Gong, we suggest that it has inherited and preserved the mystic "fox, weasel, and python" part of the tradition where spirits wandered on the earth and intermingled with humans and animals. The difference is that Li does not see humans, animals or spirits (which is a confusing term since Falun Gong considers everything as material) benignly when the traditional folklores included spirits from both sides. Instead, Li considers a portion of human race being possessed (futi) by either the evil spirits or the evil aliens. We admit that Falun Gong has carried on this part of the Chinese tradition to a wider audience and promoted it from folklores to a theology. On the other hand, Falun Gong is innovative enough to incorporate the sci-fi tradition of the western popular cultures. Li repeatedly tells the tales of the Atlantis, the Pyramid, the UFO's, extraterritorial beings (the corrupted ones), the "numbered" computer users whose bodies are taken over by aliens. In this respect, Falun Gong has shared some traits with the so-called New Age groups, such as the Heaven's Gates, excepting Li has extra extraterritorial phobia. Through over a thousand pages of the scripture, we have yet to find anything positive about life outside the Falun paradise, which Li does not describe either.

Does Falun Gong Contribute to Cultural Diversity and Tolerance?

Another frequently used defense to support the spread of Falun Gong is the principle of tolerance, similar to the multicultural understanding of different perspectives of cultures, but weaker in its demands on the host. This position is coherently part of the social tolerance and the appreciation of the richness in the different humanistic perspective. Undoubtedly, Falun Gong adds something to our (Eastern and Western) cultures: the aliens roaming on this earth after the universal purge by the Master; the principle of everything being material; the universe having three moral characters; all other gods being minors; medicines prolonging karmic retributions; and most of all, the Falun Paradise being the new location for ascension. However, we do not equate "addition" with richness. In fact, some of the "aliens" stories told by Li are so similar to the film "Progeny" it could be easily taken as a script copy from the film. These additions can hardly be considered as "richness" because they do not provide innovative solutions to our problems, nor are the perspectives honoring humanity. Empirically, from the eight-year practice of Falun Gong, some of the above "additions" proved to be fatal to some followers. Nevertheless, it has always been a matter of free choice for those who elected to follow Li's doctrines, including refusal of medication at critical times. But it must be stopped there as an individual choice, for imposing the practice of Dafa through political mechanism or deception would endanger liberties of other individuals and groups. As we have shown above, Li and his disciples attempted to accomplish their goal by using the political apparatus inside and outside China either through misrepresentation or the infringement of others rights (see the discussion of Li's advice to his disciple in educational profession to substitute the curriculum). The doctrines of intolerance explicitly advocated in Li's Frankfurt and Switzerland lectures and derived from the general theories should not be considered simply for the sake of "additions." If we disagree to the position that Falun Gong positively contributes to cultural diversity, should it be tolerated as an institution?

We here encounter a classic problem of tolerance: should tolerance be exercised toward intolerance, or should intolerance be tolerated? Or does relativism mean every theory, and practice is to be equal? Our answers are negative. As we have demonstrated above, the theories and behaviors of the Falun Gong Master and some disciples reflect a deep-seated belief of elitism (superiority of the chosen), racism (against biracial at least), and bigotry (condemning homosexuals to the harshest punishment). Tolerance in any forms or shapes of such only means intolerance to others. While these speeches may be shielded under the First Amendment , we do not have any reasons to keep silence or revere them as "scriptures" for the fear of offending the Falun Gong disciple's beliefs. Multiculturalism does not mean that mislabeling, mis-teaching or miscommunication (in short, dishonesty) should be ignored under the shield of incommensurable paradigms, a dogma criticized by Barnhart (1992) for its ignorance of basic humanity. Moreover, it requires the cultures to be open, and exchanges of ideas take place. On the contrary, Li's indoctrination leaves no room for (or a crack to slip through) open discourses - not even within the group .

Liberalism cannot defend itself without activists and active criticism. Diversity only succeeds when diverse groups coexist peacefully. It will not be diversity when one group attempts to replace other groups with political means and the misrepresentation of political means to build up its hegemony. Therefore, Falun Gong as a public institution should be open to the public discourses. Unfortunately, it is difficult to foresee Li would become a little bit more responsive. On May 2, 1999, Li declared that he would not grant interviews to reporters any more if he found out that they did not cooperate with him in the message. Moreover, since Falun Gong denies any existence of an organization, or its leader's power, it is building a closed system that no public discourse can be carried out. To the critics, the feeling of discoursing with Falun Gong disciples is often similar to that of talking to walls, or an answering machine. However, we are encouraged that those who persisted in discussions are able to solve the problems themselves, resulting in leaving Falun Gong.

We suggest, as a personal belief Falun Gong cannot be regulated. However, as its past behaviors have indicated, it should be regulated as an institution, and their responsibilities should be clarified.

Freedom and Human Rights

The most seriously considered defense of Falun Gong in the United States and parts of Europe is the concerns for human rights of the disciples and their freedom to choose their beliefs. Some politicians and journalists have persistently argued that the physical and spiritual well being of the disciples should be protected from the political actions in China. Existing scholarly studies have clearly identified linkage between regime types and general human rights conditions (Poe and Tate 1999; Zanger, S. 2000). To the apologists of Falun Gong, its cases add confirming observations.
Under such conditions, it is no surprise that when Falun Gong exhibited its political oppositional behaviors, the special treatments it had previously enjoyed for several years discontinued. It appears that the collective existence of Falun Gong has been successfully outlawed inside China despite five known attempts to reorganize in the past one year. At the same time, the Falun Gong leader(s) has been insisting upon the improvement of the human rights conditions for the disciples as a collectivity, urging them to self-sacrifice (as a measure to test their resolute and faith) in order to bolster this demand. On this subject, we share their concern from a different perspective. Our concern here is for the human rights conditions of the disciples as individuals. Such rights should be equally applied to everyone regardless to one's political beliefs or "spiritual" choices. According to the conceptualization of human rights widely used in Political Science, it converges on the quality of personal integrity regardless of the political environment (Blanton 2000; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Zanger 2000; cf. Feinberg 1973: 84–97 and Symonides 1998 for different concerns discussed below).

This personal integrity quality differentiates itself from other elements of human rights such as political rights and civil liberty. Though these two elements are important, they belong to the institutional and structural elements of the polity and it is not the subject of discussion in this paper. Moreover, it can never be overemphasized that rights are only exercised by the individuals. John Rawls in The Law of Peoples (68), as understood by Charney (1999), considers that the concept of "human rights" as "fundamentally individualistic in two related senses. First, they accrue to individuals and only to individuals rather than to individuals as members of 'corporate bodies': they protect individuals against the actions of any and all collectivities. Second, such rights give to the individual who possesses them what H.L.A. Hart has called a kind of 'sovereignty' over her moral world: to have a right is to be in a position to impose a duty on a collectivity or a political regime - any political regime - to act in certain ways toward the possessor of the right" (Charney, E. 1999, emphasis added). The Rawlsian principle broadens the obligation to include the behaviors of any collectivity. This inclusive perspective covers areas not reached by the political conceptualization of human rights. It protects the individual (by assigning rights) not only from oppressions by the larger political machines by also from the more pressing and immediate violations by the smaller collectivity. On the other hand, the collective rights fall into the "cultural" category (Symonides, J. 1998). Its claim on legitimacy is subject to evaluations according to its contribution to the problem solving.

We have discussed, above, the cultural value of Falun Gong and disputed its alleged contribution to the enrichment of cultures making it worthy of special protection and free from criticism . We believe that Falun Gong does not belong to the cultural rights deserving affirmative policy of the government. Nor is it a heritage demanding civic admiration. On the contrary, we have noted the adverse effects of Falun Gong in the destruction of traditions by misusing and misapplying traditional labels. Concerning the personal integrity of the disciples, we are interested in how the Falun Gong collectivity affects their mental well being. As Singer points out, cults create anxiety and fear causing traumatic experience among their members (1996, 137, 151, 272-3). Such psychological conditions have long been considered detrimental to personal integrity. In the 44 cases she treated as a clinical psychologist, Singer identified that the harmful effects spilled over to other family members, making them victims of the cult (Singer 2000).. Regardless of the sources, including that from the political machines or from collective pressure, mechanism - be it a state, a group, or the controlling leaders of such organizations - increasing fear and anxiety should be considered as decreasing personal integrity. This is effective because of the pyramid structures within Falun Gong. Structurally, like many other cultic organizations, there is no mechanism for the members inside Falun Gong to influence the collectivity. Li has preemptively removed any possible channels to leadership at the local or regional level and established a one-way communication from himself downward. (This is reflected in the re-organization of www.buhuo.org, a North America Falun Gong website, after it mistakenly published a piece from a disciple who questioned the authority of Minghui in mid-May. On May 23, 2000, www.buhuo.org is "merged" with www.xinxing.org under the direct control of Minghui.org. Similarly, the www.falunwitness.org now only re-transmits Minghui.org.) The Internet community in general is mostly anonymous, thus relatively free in terms of the exchanges of information. In contrast, the employment of the Internet inside Falun Gong serves a completely different function: to control and to intimidate. The Falun Gong forums are the places to continue the "experience sharing" among the fundamentalist and well-disciplined disciples. Any deviating opinions will be immediately censored, and no doctrinal questions are allowed. Similarly, the <Minghui.org> is an organization of "information dissimilation," responsible for issuing new scriptures on Li's behalf and coordinating worldwide activities. It also, in the name of being an organization of volunteers, provides a shields for the Falun Dafa Research Institute - the formal organization. Repeated attempts to contact Minghui (a website run by Ye Hao of Canada) via e-mails by one of the authors are responded with a standard disclaimer. They are "servers" or "volunteers" that only functioned to maintain the web pages publishing materials volunteered by the disciples, and they are not vested with any authority. However, it continued to publish scripture volunteered by Li from time to time and issued notices of the Falun Dafa Research Institutes. On May 13, 2000, it initiated the first "World Falun Dafa Day," an act expected to repeat every year as a measure to maintain its institutional integrity.

Since its inception, the messages carried by Minghui are increasingly threatening and ominous. In the past two months (April and May of 2000), it carries more reports of large-scale calamities than "experience sharing" articles, implying "The vows of Gods throughout history are being fulfilled" (JJYZ E, 82) in punishing the human race. The negative portrayal of the human society reduces members' individual freedom by restricting their choices of associations. It reduces their exposure to new ideas, scientific knowledge, and experience in life styles. However, the greatest threat comes from the increasing pressure from Li and his immediate followers.

On May 22, 2000 Minghui issued a 14-line verse composed by Li on October 12, 1999, after an unprecedented exactly ten-month official absence. Six lines contain overt threat to the disciples: "Winds suddenly change and the sky is about to fall. Mountainous raging seas and vicious waves come. … Shipwrecks and broken masts - Escape for life. The waves wash away the wretched and reveal the golden. It is about life and death - no boasting. … When the final truth is revealed, the heaven and earth will be empty ." (http://www.falundafa.org/script.htm). The message is clear: Choose me or eternal death. To those who had any doubts, they now fall to the "wretched" washed-away group. Damnation would be waiting for them, reinstating a threat issued on July 23, 1999 ("The promise of god is fulfilling") and a milder omen in the "Conversation with Time".

We consider it a violation of human rights when the personal integrity of individuals is threatened by a political regime. The same principle should be consistently applied to collectivity, especially when it has an authoritarian ideology and structure (see Switzerland, 6, where Li says: "About the issues of human's attempt to control one's destiny. People want to make democracy, actually people can never control their own destiny. Gods control it.") Therefore, we consider that verbal assaults by Li on his disciples, combined with its structural authoritarianism are serious threats to the personal integrity of the Falun Gong followers. The latter is a more immediate concern to the disciples here. We can imagine an objection raised by the Falun Gong defenders: everyone is free to leave, thus their personal integrity is not compromised with such an option. Both theories (Singer 1996, 266-272) and evidences (Hassan 1988) have shown the tremendous difficulties in leaving cults. In Falun Gong specifically, given the close-knit community in the place of its origin, and the "isolated" community it builds outside of China, the barriers are even higher for members to leave. We have witnessed vicious verbal attacks on "Ru Feng" and many others who announced their removal from Falun Gong .

We are reminded that all cult memberships are "free" because they do not have the institutional authority (such as police and the court) to compel behaviors. However, the usurpation of vested institutional powers of the Falun Gong disciples to promote the Falun Dafa clearly presents the danger to personal integrity of the public. We believe from our reading of Li's books and the behaviors of the disciples that the Falun Gong collectivity at least diminishes, or even destroys the personal integrity of the members.

Politics and Falun Gong

As one of the authors had argued that it is not unusual for large groups to use political institutions for aggregated interests (Deng 1999a), the trouble we have with Falun Gong is the mis-representation and misuse of the political institutions. Before 1999, Li and his disciples used the Chinese governmental institutions for legitimization beyond what is accorded to a "sports and health" association. They mobilized different political institutions to suppress critical press, blatantly took over public facilities and other properties. Since 1999, Li and his disciples collected "proclamations" in an open society and turned these "procedural" recognitions into "substantial" official sanction (Rahn 2000). It is another side of the same coin that Li played well in China.

By using and mis-representing the various government's "proclamations" and "recognitions" it had obtained in the United States as surrogates of official sanctions, Falun Gong has demonstrated its aptitude to use political tools effectively. Except the dishonesty (such as their translation of the Illinois award, which did not express what the disciple-translated Chinese version did - a praise of its "upgrading spirituality") in re-introducing these "awards," there is nothing extraordinary in seeking public acknowledgement. It has been sought after and easily obtained by many other groups, such as the Unification Church of Rev. Moon's. In addition, such activities are part of the tradition Li established since the first introduction of Falun Gong in Changchun. He started by associating himself with publicity events hosted by semi-governmental organizations (the China Qigong Association) by portraying himself as a "star" at conferences. It should be our concerns not because of the number of "proclamations" it had collected - we cannot second-guess the operations of local governments in the United States, but it should be our concern how they are collected, repackaged (translated) and used to the audience. Even to some residents in the United States, they could not or chose not to distinguish these "Proclamations of Li Hongzhi Day" by the city or state governments' public relations routines and the legitimization or sanction of beliefs (Rahn 2000).

There is a need to alert public institutions of the doctrines of Falun Gong, Civic groups should respond to such manipulations of political machines. One such approach is to strengthen the archives of watch groups such as the American Family Foundation, to include materials related to Falun Gong. Another is to ally with other civic groups, such as the civil rights activists, gays and lesbian organization in combating Li's hateful messages.

In conclusion, we do not intend to debate the validity of various types of liberalism or the alternative approaches based on the argument of common good. We do want to point out that the liberal principle should be critically applied to safeguard itself from its demise. We should be alert to potential dangers to the open society. We have also noted that Falun Gong is never a tolerant practice in its social and political understanding, despite its sometimes translation of Ren as tolerance in its label. To indiscriminately apply liberal defense of the freedom and liberty for any type of beliefs should also be ensure that criticisms of such beliefs are protected. That is, liberalism should not be the shield for cultic activities. Otherwise, this lends to the impracticability and contradictions in the discussion of appropriate public policies. Liberal use of the rule of absolute tolerance in protection of a potentially dangerous mass group, even the results include some foreseeable but yet actual harms, may end liberalism as it is.

Often, Falun Gong has manipulated the liberal press into believing that liberalism should not only protect the liberty of thoughts and beliefs, and their expressions, but should do so regardless of the forms of expression or at the expense of violating legal constraints. This is where we strongly disagree with some of the defenders of Falun Gong such as Hu Ping (2000).

Our foremost specific concern is the case of medical science. We agree so much that we should tolerate various kinds of personal beliefs, as long as they may not harm other individuals in their execution of the beliefs. Should this boundary be violated, the persons and collectively the group should be held accountable for the consequences. Obviously, discouraging others from seeking appropriate medical treatment should be considered as harmful behaviors. This would become a public health issue when such "options" are exercised by disciples in medical professions. We must be convinced that the Hypocrates Oath is still the overriding belief when a disciple is prescribing medication and not violating his/her beliefs in Li. Moreover, we need the assurance that a disciple physician would be examining the patients according to the "ordinary people's" standards, or those followed by the medical profession. As Li has led disciples to believe and practice health recovery through practicing Falun Gong, and explicitly prohibits treating illness with his Fa, it becomes our concerns as to whether his disciples in medical profession would extend such a principle as to accumulate De. Since there is no existing religion having such a doctrine, we have yet to see a corresponding policy to deal with this issue of public health. Moreover, it is unforeseeable that Li would make such an amendment despite his claim of "utmost conformity to human society." It should be the public concern that Falun Gong disciples should be allowed to practice medicine.

Our second concern is the openness of Falun Gong. In the past, extreme cults with a large base are rare. Though Falun Gong itself does not portray any hints of mass destruction tendency as that of the Aum Shrinikyo, its threat comes from a different source. Despite Li's repeated denial of political intentions, there are behaviors that pointing to active suppression of inside and outside dissent. Some of their activities had demonstrated that Li did not accept a liberal principle of criticism, and did not take suggestions and supervisions benignly. Instead, Li would counter any criticism with a threat and acts of mass demonstration, actively suppressing any oppositions with the mass number under his direction. Given the fact that Falun Gong had a large mass base indoctrinated with intolerance ideas, having the rapid mobility of an efficient organization, and having demonstrated its political ambitions, the real danger is the lack of freedom to criticize Falun Gong in China. This may seem to be strange when the government is busy enforcing the laws to outlaw Falun Gong. However, criticism of Falun Gong from civic groups and religious circles are rarely publicized in mass media, except the Internet (though some of them are even blocked simply because they criticized Falun Gong). It would be like allowing a theocratic demagogue a free hand in achieving its religious and political ambitions, while ignoring, suppressing, or repressing outside criticism. A takeover of policy by Falun Gong would pose a clear danger of potential religious prosecution - it is possible, if the membership is as large as it claimed and the positions of the members are as crucial as they revealed. Its theological attitude toward minority groups, such as gays and lesbians and the majority groups, such as computer users, clearly would lead to our demise once Falun Gong prevails. It should be hard for liberalism to defend the ideology of intolerance.

In terms of overall policy, while the authors agree that individual's belief, religious or not, should be a private matter protected under the controlling laws, we also take note of the clear and present danger of some practice of Falun Gong: its self-destructive behaviors, its irresponsible social behaviors, and its deceptions to the disciples and the general public. We have reservations to the idea of allowing Falun Gong to regularly (in fact, daily) occupy public space for their "belief" activities as they used to do - a privilege that other groups did not enjoy. Conceding this "regular" and prolonged (several hours a day, just in the rush hours) use of public land, given the shortage of urban space in China, is equivalent to a tax subsidy to this group and depriving others equal access to the same facility. In addition, the most important problem is its persistent relegation of responsibility, taking the advantage of "loose" organization and no responsibility. Such a structure gave rise to extreme groups within the fringe group. Internally, despite Li's repeated warnings, "fake "scriptures"" continue to appear, including some suggesting mass suicide. This produces additional confusions both to the disciples and outsiders.

We need to be alert to cultic activities. As social scientists have long been aware of the interference of the observer in investigative studies, a direct observation of cults seldom generates useful information. The lack of direct observation can be compensated with some other methods used by social scientists. One such method is that used by many studies of fringe group activities. We believe that a balance between moral responsibility and protection of individual liberty can be achieved. Some authors have explored such an approach. In "A Naturalist View of Religious Conversion," J. E. and M. A. Barnhart provided a meticulous description and analysis of the "new birth" phenomenon in the United States. The groups of interest are then mostly considered as "cults" though these authors purposely avoid such a term. They suggested some methods to understand the conversion experience and the groups' recruitment tactics (1981, 148-157), evaluating their honesty, their indoctrination and room for future correction. According to these guidelines, we would like to see the Falun Gong debate carry out in such a manner: expose the dishonesty of Li's recruitment tactics, make the leader(s) clearly identify their theological (a god or a human) or organizational positions, and make them clarify their responsibilities. We shall morally condemn its opposition to open-mindedness, and the tactics to suppress opposition from other groups. We shall also prohibit its use of public resources (such as public schools) to promote its doctrines.
Finally, we must explore a multi-disciple method to cope with the multi-facets of the cultic activities. There are three reasons. First, cults of the millennium are often cloaked with the labels of sciences. Some claim to be the scientific methods of management (Scientology), some pretend to be miracle makers (Falun Gong), while others are spilling "public health" management techniques (Unification Church). In the case of Falun Gong, most of the contentious facts are related to the health and medical claims. Without the knowledge of medicine or biology (in case of the study of the human body), the analysis of facts will be incomplete, or our argument will be weakened when professionals such as Dr. Lili Feng present a "scientific" discovery that does not conform to scientific principles but using the prestige of the institutions they are associated with; or as Zhan Jingyi did to claim the "Yuanshen" observation method and substantiated it with known chemical formulae. The second is the complexity of the legal constraints. While legal scholars have successfully defended the legitimacy of cultic researches, other areas need further explorations that involve broader knowledge. Cults in the millennium operate under a global environment with rapid mobility. An anti-cult organization based on one nation only is often disadvantaged in competition with the cults. Some cults may take the legal loopholes in one country and appear to be a civic organization in another, without changing its doctrines. The third reason is the increasingly open activities of cults. Cults of the millennium tend to come out from secrecy, more skilled in using publicists and media tools, political resources, and legitimization procedures. Like the Jim Jones of the 70s, cults are now again in our midst. They openly operate as benign civil societies, taking the tolerant constitutional protection of liberties given to religion. Some, such as Falun Gong, even deny themselves as religions and refuse to be regulated in the principle of the separation of religion and the state. Or they choose to claim to be a super-religion. While laws and courts are always reactive to facts, the protection of the general good must be upon other civic groups who are equally equipped with the political knowledge. Therefore, in addition to the traditional forces composed of psychologists, theologians, and legal experts; anti-cult organization of the millennium needs to include natural scientists, political scientists, communication specialists, and medical professionals in a global network.

Notes:

58. The recent introduction of hate crime legislation is a significant step toward a standard, yet to be tested in courts, to regulate such speeches.

59. The most recent example was the exchange between Pang Shanshan of Hong Kong and Li Hongzhi, who demanded Pang stop her planned celebration of the Dafa from May 6 (the starting day of Falun Gong eight years ago)-11 (Li's second birthday), two to seven days ahead of his own celebration. (See Attachment Appendix 5)

60. This refers to the tax exemption status since 1992, including the "internal" sales of books and Falun Emblems and the conspicuous existence without legal registration from 1996 to 1999.

61. The first was immediately after the enactment of the regulation banning Falun Gong on July 20, 1999. The second was the small organized protest during Kofi Anan's visit to China. The third was the New Year's Eve attempt to "press" their case with the public. The fourth was a repetition in the Chinese New Year. The last one was on the one year anniversary of the April 25 gathering around Zhong Nanhai of Beijing.

62. It should be noted that Falun Gong does not recognize "spiritual" nor choices. In this regard, it propagates a all-material deterministic doctrine.

63. One of the policy demands by Falun Gong was the allocation of scarce public land, at their choice, for their daily gatherings and free from financial charges such as taxation from the sales of the scriptures through "internal" publication channels. They ground such demands on the premise for cultural preservation, that Li embodies the traditional cultures of the world. This contrasts the ongoing debate of ceremonial whale killing by the North American aboriginal tribes as a method of cultural preservation. Thus comes the question of the qualification to be a culture.

64. Such as http://omniboard.hypermart.net/falun/mainpage.pl. with as disciple-webmaster monitoring every post.

65. The official translation was released on May 25, 2000. We consider it a "watered down" version, as in many other translations.

66. It took place in the months of April and May over the "Beliefs" forum (www.fojiao.net). In the Falun Gong forums run by the disciples, It is a standard practice to suppress any dissent or questions of the doctrines.

(New Threads, Revised May 31, 2000)

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