Falun G ong,foundered by Li Hongzhi in 19 9 2,rapidly expanded its missionary in China and
evoked cult controversy over believers?devotion to Li Hongzhi in China. Conversely, human
rights watch groups and refugees of Falun G ong in western countries criticized Chinese govern-ment and strongly demanded immediate cessation of its repression. Although Chinese govern-ment as well as Chinese Academy has not changed official position to Falun G ong, they seem to
have acknowledged that a cult issue is problematic. Chinese history has too many cases to
enumerate spiritual cults and religious millennialism that were heretic and subversive
from the perspective of successive imperial dynasties. Even if Falun G ong is considered to
have the same character, it cannot be sufficient reason of political restriction in a country where
freedom of religion constitutionally guaranteed. They consider the necessity of legitimacy not
only of Chinese legislation but also of universal criteria, so that they called experts of cult issue
from the western countries (England,G ermany,Canada,USA) as well as Asian (India,Singapore,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan). I was only participant from Japan and reported
Japanese cult controversy in present day Japan.
This paper first introduces recent cult controversy and review cultic studies in Japan. Then
I will illustrate major controversial cults (Aum Supreme Truth Cult-Aleph in present,Unification
Church, and JM S from South Korea) and minor cultic groups (Hallelujah Community Church,
M akomo Shrine, and Home of Heart). The latter is small independent Religious Corporation or
self-awareness therapy group. Last I will explain about the social background where such cults
and spiritual movement emerged in Japan and point out the fragility that some Japanese as well
as victimized cult members hold, which should be overcome in near future.
Key words: cult, Falun G ong, Aum, Unification Church, fragility
(Received on D ecember 17, 2007)
29
Journal of the G raduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University
Vol. 3; pp. 29 -38, M arch 2008
?C 2008 by the G raduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University
Yoshihide SAKURAI: saku＠let.hokudai.ac.jp
1. Comparative and Sociological Perspective on Cultic Study
On M arch 20,19 9 5 disciples of the Aum Supreme Truth Cult (hereinafter Aum) released sarin
nerve gas in five Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 and seriously injuring over 5,500 people.
Through this terrifying incident, Japan had to directly face “cults”as a social problem. The
media, baffled by the fact that this unprecedented crime was perpetrated by young people with
religious backgrounds, sought explanations from psychiatrists and psychologists. In a Marh
24th article, M argaret Singer, renowned a U. S. cult researcher commented on Aum, calling it a
doomsday cult. Since then, Aum has been understood by Japanese society as a “cult”(Sakurai,
2000: 74).
Psychologists and anti-cult people in Japan began to adopt views on “cults”and “mind
control”from American anti-cult activists, explaining the traits of cult groups and the mental state
of Aum followers (Nishida, 19 9 5; Takimoto and Nagaoka eds., 19 9 5; Pascal, 19 9 5). The
Japanese media thus started to cover “religious trouble”caused by particular religious groups as
the “cult”problem. In regard to those media reports, Japanese researchers of religion, while also
learning about cults based on the findings of U. S. religious sociology, have expressed different
opinions; we stated that the criteria of a cult was vague and the theory of “mind control”alone
could not sufficiently explain how and why certain people decided to join the cult and followed
Aum?s religious teachings (Sakurai, 19 9 6;Shimazono, 19 9 8;W atanabe, 19 9 8). This is how cult
disputes in W estern countries were imported to Japan.
Soon, studies undertaken from social and cultural perspectives followed. Some pointed out
recent transformations of religious organizations of a closed nature in information-oriented
consuming society (Shimazono, 19 9 6, 19 9 7) and explained the “hyper”edited version or
“syncretism”of different religious cultures of new religion in the age of globalization (Inoue,
19 9 9 ). Others interpreted the anti-cult movement as a nationalistic response to different cultures
(Nakano, 2002). Yet, though their critiques might have succeeded in sketching modern-day
religion, none could present cogent arguments about how to specifically confront the violence of
religion and deal with religion-induced damage; they were not as convincing as anti-cult
movements.
Sakurai realized that Japanese researchers could not handle religion-related problems in
Japanese society even with imported W estern theories of “cults”and “mind control”and/or
sociology of religion (Sakurai, 2002). Thus, in 19 9 7, Sakurai began conducting a series of
surveys on Aum, the Unification Church, Jehovah?s W itness, self-awareness training, and other
cultic groups. The purpose was to examine the existing situations of why certain religious groups
were deemed problematic “cults”and why their missionary and recruiting technique were
considered “mind control.”The survey methods included examining court proceedings and
defense counsel resources, interviewing former members or defectors, their family members, and
acquaintances, and obtaining the expert opinions of religious personnel and counselors who had
supported them. As a result, Sakurai concluded that cult issue should be considered social
problems (Sakurai, 2003).
In November, 2003 a Japanese panel was convened on “The G rowth Strategy of New
Religions in Japan”as a special session at the American Academy of Religion (AAR) annual
Yoshihide SAKURAI 30
meeting. W e discussed the social background behind the emergence of cult problems in postwar
Japan. Yet there was a difference in awareness of the problems between the author and western
researchers of new-religion (Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, 2001). Afterwards, as I further discussed
the anti-cult movement with them, I recognized the following as fundamentally different points
in perceiving the problems:
(1) U. S. religious sociologists, while perceiving the conservative swing of Japanese society in
response to the the Anti-Aum Law and the anti-Aum movement by local residents, lack the
awareness of the relations between the U. S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq following 9 -11 and
America?s nationalism and religious culture. Rather, they believe that the religious pluralism of
fundamental “freedom of religion”and “religious tolerance”can neutralize nationalism and ease
religious and ethnic conflicts. This belief may be valid as an academic theory, but has definite
gaps in reality. This experience once again confirmed the double standard between the language
the U. S. uses for its domestic politics and diplomatic practice.
(2) W estern researchers have difficulty comprehending the manipulative spiritual sales by the
Unification Church in Japan. They often feel incredulous upon hearing that such sales totaled
over 9 5 billion yen (approximately 8 million dollars) between 19 87 and 2006. Even if they accept
the story, they cannot comprehend the mentality behind it ---why so many people willingly paid
so much money to Unification Church recruiters,even if the latter had employed intimidation. It
is certainly true that this type of spiritual sales strategy may work only in Japan. On the other
hand, it is also true that many people in W estern societies have suffered monetary and psychologi-cal damage due to the quasi-psychotherapy program of Scientology. Thus, the type of fraud a
citizen is vulnerable to depends on the religious culture of that person.
(3) A dispute has long continued to rage over the psychological manipulation by cults, as a
method of mind control, and regarding the issue of intervention in the religious life by exit-counseling. W as it a voluntary conversion or a coerced conversion through psychological
manipulation? W as it a voluntary defection or a coerced abandonment of religion? Aside from
the peculiarities of each cult group, the difference is how the independence of individuals and
family ties are perceived in each of the different cultures.
Sakurai realized that while fellow researchers are discussing the same subject of cult prob-lems, there was a gap in understanding on the subject. For international discussions, I found it
necessary to conduct comparative sociological examinations of public order, which include
cultures and social norms. Only by comparing the social structure and its components ---social
system, cultural traditions, citizens?“common sense,”all of which could construct the “cult”
problem, can we clarify the differences in public awareness and the social method of shaping
public spheres. Although it is called the “cult”problem, the nature of conflicts and the
anti-cult/sect measure differ greatly between Europe (and inside the EU as well) and the United
States, and between Japan and other Asian nations. For this reason, the “cult”problem should
be considered through international comparisons. In this respect, the opportunity offered by the
international symposium on the cult problem --- to exchange opinions among international
researchers ---is invaluable.
In the following, I will introduce several cases of the cult problem in Japan today, in the
hopes that they will be used as data for future cult problem research.
The Cult Problem in Present-D ay Japan 31
2. The Cult Problem in Japan
2.1 Various Problems Involving On-Campus Recruiting
Years have passed since the recruiting by the Unification Church, Setsuri, Jodo Shinshu
Shinrankai, or camouflaged groups, as well as psychological therapy groups in which recruiting
is incorporated into their program, became social problems in Japan. There are also other
groups that conduct pseudo-psychological counseling during college festivals without revealing
their names and then use the obtained personal data for future recruitment activities. These
organizations typically have a technical manual of social psychology on how to persuade people.
Some not only conceal important information from students but also deftly manipulate their
uneasy or distressed state of mind. This time, though, I wish to discuss some indoctrination
methods of certain cult groups, which can be attractive to students (Sakurai, 2007c).
First, such groups approach students in a receptive manner so that they can help realize the
wish of the younger generation for acceptance by others. Recruiters are not only mild-mannered,
but also build personal relationships necessary for indoctrination by giving the impression that
they will watch over each person and nurture them in peer groups. Colleges nowadays focus
almost exclusively on the content of the academic subjects they teach and are concerned about
personal relationships inappropriately or inefficiently interfering with the college curricula.
Thus, cult groups succeed in converting students by focusing on the power of personal relation-ships ---relationships that are commonly seen and nurtured in preschool and elementary educa-tion.
Second, those groups offer a detailed programme to somewhat naive students who are not
accustomed to decision making or to the new non-interfering environment of college life. They
provide students with a golden opportunity. As a result of dismantling the general education
which college used to provide between secondary and higher education, students today no longer
have the time or environment to nurture their own views on life and the world. This is exactly
where cult groups come in. To students who are not sufficiently motivated (or cannot determine
their own course) toward learning specialized education, knowledge, and techniques, those
recruiters can strike them as helpful seniors or leaders.
I recognize the fact that various club activities and other circles can have a positive impact
on young students, and that an abundance of such activities is actually good for college education.
But the problem is that some groups obviously cross the boundary of decency. The following are
some examples:
(1) Freedom of religion can be violated through the recruiting activity of camouflaged
groups. Recruiting students are used to lies since they think the end justifies the means and
themselves use any means. Furthermore, they do not even see the possibility that they have been
deceived.
(2) The self-governance of college education can be threatened by student groups that are
controlled by outsiders. In the face of explicit criticism against certain religious groups, such
groups may counter by hiring legal counsel and demanding tolerance and non-intervention from
college authorities.
(3) The pursuit of education, the primary objective of college, can be replaced by the pursuit
32 Yoshihide SAKURAI
of religious group activities. In that case, educational guidance will be necessary and this is the
only point of defense the college can use to intervene in the personal affairs of students. Not
surprisingly, many religious groups scheme to distract colleges from claiming this point.
How should faculty members view the fact that a great number of students attempt to reinvent
themselves based on the values of certain religious groups in the critical period of college life
when, in my opinion, a broader perspective and worldview should be nurtured? This point
warrants further discussion (Sakurai, 2007b).
2.2 The Unification Church: An Organization That Conducts Illegal Fundraising
In 2003, a former Unification Church member in her late sixties filed a 670-million-yen
(approximately 5.7 million dollars) damage claim against the church. She demanded that the
church return the money she had donated since the early 19 9 0s while she belonged to the church.
Let us look at the background.
Since the 19 80s, the Unification Church has conducted recruiting activities in the form of
fortunetelling by name or family tree, targeting middle-aged and older people. The church
invited wealthy people, in particular, to a variety of posh events and treated them exceptionally
well. The strategy was to gradually coax those people of means into donating money to the
church. The plaintiff was recruited in one of those events.
If a citizen noticed something suspicious or abnormal about a certain religious group before
joining the organization, and then filed a damage suit against it, then that person could obtain
legal redress for his or her losses owing to manipulative spiritual sales. But in this case, the act
of donating money by the plaintiff after joining the church was deemed religious activity engaged
in of her own free will, thus the claim was rejected. In a nutshell, church would never pay back
donations to soon-to-be former members. The court understood that she was a member because
of the spiritual effect (religious relief) in accordance with her donation; a certain equivalent
exchange was deemed to be established. However, lawyers began to think that once a case of
illegal missionary activity was established, the act of donating money to the church could be also
considered damage to the plaintiff under illegal circumstances. If the court acknowledged that
former members joined the church and were forced to conduct illegal manipulative sales not by
their free will, then their act of donating money should also be deemed unlawful solicitation of
donations, and not by free will.
The Unification Church, on the other hand, responded that the plaintiff had continued to
make donations of her own free will and pointed out a series of her church activities as supporting
evidence. In 2006, the Tokyo D istrict Court ruled that less than half of the 50 acts of making
donations were illegal. In the 2007 appeal trial, the verdict in the first trial was upheld. The
reasoning behind the decision was as follows:
It is illegal to solicit donations through intimidation, claiming, for example, that the souls of
a member?s ancestors will not be saved. However, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
done so using explicit language. But the plaintiff sometimes made a donation after simply
receiving a request by telephone, not after a spiritual talk or ritual. In those cases, it is deemed
that the plaintiff donated money of her own free will. Therefore, the unlawful solicitation of
donations through intimidation was acknowledged only on two occasions:when the plaintiff was
33 The Cult Problem in Present-D ay Japan
first recruited and immediately before she fled the church. However, this verdict is problematic
in the following ways:
(1) According to the verdict, when the plaintiff wished to resist the illegal recruiting and
soliciting by the church, the presence of illegality was acknowledged. But when she was a
member obediently responding to requests for donations, her donations were all deemed volun-tary. In other words, as the plaintiff?s mistrust grew towards the church, her donations came to
be deemed illegal. Although the Unification Church?s method of urging members to donate
money was always consistent, depending on how the plaintiff felt about the method, it could be
legal or illegal. And once that decision was made by the court, even if the plaintiff is presently
seeking damages against the church, we are told that that decision will stand no matter what.
(2) Aside from the appropriateness of the circumstances of the donation request, was the
amount of donation within a socially acceptable range? It is true that the plaintiff was treated
well by the Unification Church. Specifically, she received seven copies of the holy book “D ivine
Principle,”which had been autographed by the founder Sun M yung M oon and allegedly valued
at 30 million yen (approximately 256 thousand dollars). She also enjoyed VIP status in the
church under the title of“Benefactor.”Yet, did that life justify paying 670-million-yen (approxi-mately 5.7 million dollars) ?
According to current law, activities such as the missionary work and fundraising events of the
Unification Church are not comprehensively deemed as illegal group activities, thus the court
must determine illegality based on individual circumstances. The ruling also stated, “Because we
cannot consider all the donations made over the 12-year period to have been extorted through
intimidation, we have no choice but judge each case separately.”Yet this is painfully obvious.
If the situation is such that mental and physical threats must be made in each case in order for
members to obey, that is akin to the oppression of slaves or colonial rule. Clearly, this is an
inefficient system; thus, indoctrination is adopted as an appropriate measure. W hether it is a
religious or ideological organization, because its members are under the paradoxical rule of
voluntary obedience to the leader or values, the organization can form a strong movement.
2.3 Aum Today
As of 2007, Aum (Aleph) has 650 live-in followers and over 1,000 lay followers in Japan, and
approximately 300 members in Russia. It has 29 facilities in 15 prefectures in Japan and several
facilities in M oscow, Russia. How should we treat those people in Japanese society in the future?
In 2006, judging that Aum may still attempt to carry out another indiscriminate attack in the
future, the Public Security Examination Commission extended the surveillance on Aleph. The
decision was based on the fact that the group had retained the dogmatic system and organizational
structure that remained devoted to Shoko Asahara (born Chizuo M atsumoto) who was sentenced
to death in September, 2006. There were also a great number of followers who appeared
unrepentant over their criminal acts including the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway. The
objection of the local community, who must coexist with Aleph, also remains very strong. There
are approximately 230 groups in 180 municipalities in Japan that oppose the expansion of Aleph.
They have filed 225 requests and petitions to the M inister of Justice and the D irector of the Public
Security Intelligence Agency to renew the surveillance period and to strengthen regulations
34 Yoshihide SAKURAI
against Aleph. As a result, security police and local police have continued their surveillance of
Aleph. Spot inspections have been conducted 146 times, as well as 31 interviews to confirm the
identity of members. So far, the survey results have been presented 388 times to 43 municipalities
(Public Security Intelligence Agency, 2007).
Aleph still continues to recruit members (by hosting various seminars) and hold fundraising
events. One involved a Chinese imported medicine with steroids called “Togen.”Some Aleph
members received jail sentences after Tokyo Branch members sold it in violation of the Pharma-ceutical Affairs Law. W e will probably never see Aleph approved as a religious corporation,but
the national government has no authority to stop their activity as a religious group. Likewise,
municipalities have no authority to reject the residency of its members. Once they legally obtain
or rent a domicile, it is their right to reside there. In that case, there is no legal basis supporting
the anti-Aleph movement of local residents. Neither the Executive nor the Judicial branch can
make any move; only the Public Security Intelligence Agency has continued its surveillance on
Aleph.
The basic faction that continues to worship Asahara is still powerful. M eanwhile,Fumihiro
Joyu, the former Aum spokesperson and de facto chief, in an attempt to distance himself from
Asahara, launched a new group called “Hikari no W a (Ring of Light)”in M ay, 2007, leaving
Aleph along with 200 followers (Yomiuri Shimbun, M ay 7, 2007). Yet, many Aleph followers
believe that Joyu still submits to Asahara and they therefore stand by Joyu as well. It is
unknown whether there are hidden power struggles inside Aleph.
2.4 Cult Problems in the New Century
From around the mid-19 9 0s,the Japanese economy endured a long period of stagnation,from
which it is now finally emerging. Currently, one serious problem is the growing gap between
classes, which has become a major social issue. Until the 19 80s, the main factor was economic
inequality caused by disparities in assets such as real estate and stocks. Since then, the manufac-turing industry, which used to be at the heart of the Japanese economy, has moved overseas or
greatly reduced wage and salary costs by employing a large number of non-full-time workers. As
a result, stable workplaces for skilled or semi-skilled workers have disappeared. Only certain
groups of workers with high productivity receive high salaries; M cD onald?s-like replaceable
low-wage service-sector workers have grown in number. In the latter case, they can barely make
ends meet, and cannot even think about getting married and/or starting a family. For such
non-full-time workers, losing a job often means losing a place to live. According to the M inistry
of Health, Labor and W elfare, currently, 5,400 workers sleep at 24-hour Internet cafes and the
homeless population numbers 18,564 (a drop from the 30,000 figure of 2003). Even middle-class
full-time workers are stressed out due to the concentrated and long hours of work required for
high productivity. Labor in Japan has become unstable, and there are an increasing number of
people who have trouble earning a steady living or having a positive outlook for the future.
History shows that whenever a large number of people of a class or a group experience
downward mobility as well as economic downturns, religious movements emerge. Yet, in Japan,
no new religious movement aspiring to reform society has emerged. The labor movement has
also been on the decline, and the social movement to reform society has lost its momentum. The
35 The Cult Problem in Present-D ay Japan
new religious movement that saved the poor and the sick in postwar Japan seems to have failed
to attract the young and middle-age population; the age of followers of new religions continues
to rise. Instead, the “therapy”culture, in which people can purchase personal and psychological
relief for themselves with a touch of neoliberalism, has thrived. It ranges from psychotherapy,
such as counseling and coaching, to spiritual services like “healing.”One popular example is the
New-Age worldview captured in the slogan “change yourself, then the world will change.”
Apart from on-campus recruiting by various cultic groups and manipulative spiritual sales
methods of the Unification Church, and the remaining members of Aleph, common religious
cult-related problems in our times are relatively minor. These include inappropriate relations
between therapist and client, the misappropriation of client money by spiritual mediums, and the
abuse of members by a priest at a small, exclusive church. Here, allow me to introduce some
typical examples.
The chief priest of the Hallelujah Community Church (independent religious corporation) in
Hamamatsu, Shizuoka Prefecture is currently being sued over alleged assaults on his followers
(suspected of severe physical punishment, humiliation, and sexual harassment) (2006 ワwa) Vol.
7, Shizuoka D istrict Court). The case is pending in court. Since some evangelical churches
demand that their followers be obedient to the absolute authority of priests, the autocratic nature
of their leaders is conspicuous. In the case of independent churches, there is no denomination
to take a leadership role and supervise, and a cultic nature seems to develop relatively easily.
The guru of the M akomo Shrine (independent religious corporation) in G ifu Prefecture sold
M akomo health food (made from cattail leaves and stems) as a remedy to cure all kinds of
illnesses. Some patients diagnosed with a refractory disease rejected conventional medicine and
took M akomo. As a result, some people became seriously ill or died. On July 18, 2005 a
12-year-old girl who had been under dietary treatment at the“Next G eneration Farm Lab,”a food
laboratory run by the guru, died. She had been diagnosed with Type-I diabetes. The guru was
brought up on criminal charges but the case was dismissed. The girl?s parents filed a damage
claim and the case is currently pending in court.
In 2004, participants of “Home of Heart,”a self-awareness training seminar, filed a several-million-yen (approximately 60 thousand dollars) damage suit against its organizers at the Tokyo
D istrict Court, claiming that they had been forced to take a 300,000-yen (approximately 2.6
thousand dollars) seminar repeatedly. In 2007 the plaintiff won the case. The former lead
vocalist of the X-Japan rock group, Toshi, had participated in the seminar. His female fans
(including several divorced women with children) were forced to lead a communal life. Home
of Heart was charged on suspicion of not providing an adequate nursing environment;two infants
and four small children were taken into custody by the authorities.
In response to the accusations of the former participants, the lawyers on the Home of Heart
side countered with a defamation suit, requesting disciplinary action. M ultiple lawsuits have
been launched. This is a typical case of a cultic training seminar in which the issues are
psychotherapy that leaves participants traumatized and bankruptcy of seminar participants due to
the exorbitant seminar fees.
36 Yoshihide SAKURAI
3. Conclusions
In a complex modern world, it is extremely important to be able to deal with various risks.
Unfortunately, the ability to avoid risks is unequally distributed in society. The instability and
intraclass gaps in modern society divide our culture hierarchically. Our primary culture seems to
be disappearing and is fragmenting into sub-cultures according to class. Because the cultural
ability of risk hedging has been declining, people tend to be more vulnerable to troubles. At the
same time, since sophisticated religious cultures and religious groups teaching human wisdom
have lost much of their power, religious groups that are insensitive to the ill effects of religion are
being generated. Thus, it is only natural that many Japanese citizens who claim to practice no
religion and have only a fragile view of life and death, tend to exclude religion from their lives,
and therefore, lack knowledge of religious cultures and different religions, making them vulner-able to cult groups and false spirituality (Sakurai, 2006; 2007a).
Those who have been victimized by cultic groups share several common threads of vulnerabil-ity:
(1) Socioeconomic Fragility: they entrust themselves to a religious group, where there are
people who will take care of them.
(2) Fragility in Identity: once they start a journey of self-discovery, they seem to have no
control over when or where to stop.
(3) Fragile Relationships:they thoroughly indulge in the communal nature of exclusive cultic
groups.
(4) Fragility in Intelligence: they easily embrace pseudoscience and lack common sense.
Now, the question is “Are those fragile qualities part of their personality, and do they deserve
what they?ve gotten themselves into?”Those qualities, including personal knowledge and the
ability to make judgments, can be dictated by social environment to a certain degree. If there are
family members who they can depend on psychologically and economically, and who they can
consult with in times of crisis, trouble can be avoided to a great extent.
In the future, it will be necessary to further clarify those weaknesses to cultic groups and come
up with methods to overcome them. Yet, both the Executive and Judicial branches operate
slowly, because they attempt to tackle the cult problem with the noble and abstract mind-set of
“freedom of religion.”For this reason, they lean on the ideal that all religions were selected by
their followers of their own free will. And,as a rule,a religious problem is considered a personal
problem that exists inside the mind of the individual. Thus, Executive and Judicial intervention
has been avoided.
The reality, however, is that a number of religious groups practice illegal recruiting, fundrais-ing, and physical abuse on their followers. One cannot say the existing situation is such that
followers join the organizations by their own free will and conduct missionary work at their
discretion. Therefore, it is important to persistently inform the Executive and Judicial branches
of government, the media and the general public about the current circumstances. It is a long,
yet steady and certain way to overcome the cult problem in Japan.
37 The Cult Problem in Present-D ay Japan
References
Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, 2001, Benjamin Zablocki and Thomas Robbins eds., M isunderstanding Cults, University
of Toronto Press, Toronto
Inoue, Nobutake, 19 9 9 , Lost Coordinates; The Youth and Present-D ay Religion, Chikuma-Shobo.
Public Security Agency, 2007, interview: its contents will be published in a Police W hite Paper, 2008
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 19 9 6, One Examination of the D escription of the Aum Phenomenon;a Critical Examination
on M ind Control Language, M odern Sociological Study, Vol. 9 .
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2002, Forms of the Cult Problem in Japan;the Issue of Religious Sociological Cult Research,
Nanzan Religious Culture Laboratory, ed., Between Religion and Social Issues;the Cult Problem, Seikyu-sha,
pp. 100-118.
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2003, Trials and the M ind Control D ispute;Over the ?Forceful Persuasion?and ?Responsibility
for Illegal Acts,?Hokkaido University G raduate School of Letters, 109 , pp. 59 -175.
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2005, Various Problems of Survey Research on the Cult Problem;Regarding the Framing and
Narrative, “Annual Report: Social Science Basics Research,”Vol. 4, pp. 57-75.
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2006, Reexamining the ?Cult?, Chuokoron-shinsha.
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2007a, The Relationship Between the Cult Problem and Intraclass G aps,W atanabe,Naoki,ed.,
A G uide to Understanding Religion and the M odern Age, Heibonsha, pp. 140-143.
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2007b, Religious Literacy Education as an Anti-Cult M easure, International Religious
Laboratory, M odern Religion 2007; the Horizon of Religious Education, Akiyama Shoten, pp. 300-321.
Sakurai, Yoshihide, 2007c, The Cult Problem on Campus; W hy Students Join Setsuri, High School Education
Journal ---High School Education and Continuing Education, Vol. 15, pp. 1-13.
Shimazono, Susumu, 19 9 6, The Commercialization of the Sacred;Changes in Religious Services and G ift G iving,
Shimazono, Susumu, and Ishi, Kenji, eds., Consumption of Religion, Shunju-sha, pp. 88-110.
Shimazono, Susumu, 19 9 7, Possibilities of M odern-D ay Religion;Aum Shinrikyo and Violence, Iwanami Shoten.
Shimazono, Susumu, 19 9 8, Beyond M ind Control; Legal Accusations of Religious G roups and Socioecological
Criticism, Psychiatrics, 40-10, 11.
Takimoto, Taro and Nagaoka, Tatsuya, eds., Free from M ind Control; the Experiences of Aum Shinrikyo
D efectors, Koyu Shuppan.
Nakano, Takeshi, 2002, The Restoration of Religion; G lobalization, the Cult D ispute, Nationalism, Tokyo-D o
Shuppan.
Nishida, Kimiaki, 19 9 5, W hat is M ind Control? Kinokuniya Books.
Pascal, Zivi 19 9 5, Exit M ind Control; the Hearts of Unification Church Followers, Koyu Shuppan.
Yamaguchi, Hiroshi, et al., 2000, Countermeasures for Cult Religions, Kyoiku Shiryo Shuppankai.
W atanabe, M anabu, 19 9 8, One Perspective on the Cult Theory; the M ind Control D ispute in the United States,
Chugai Nippo, D ec. 15th and 17th, 19 9 8.
38 Yoshihide SAKURAI
