In late July, two events occurred between China and the US.
One was public: the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressional body, visited China after a seven-year hiatus, touring Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. The other, reported by the Associated Press, involved internal State Department documents and congressional notifications, revealing that the Trump administration is reviving anti-China projects cut last year on a large scale, involving over $500 million.
A hawkish delegation had barely left when a large-scale anti-China plan was exposed.
This is not a coincidence. It's a standard pattern in US operations against China: first, send people to investigate, then spend money on containment. The problem is, China has long seen through this trick. What exactly is the US trying to achieve? Has China been set up? I. Hawkish Visits to China Are Never for Dialogue
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, established by the U.S. Congress in 2000, is nominally there to monitor the impact of U.S.-China trade and economic relations on U.S. national security. However, its actions in the last two years reveal its true purpose. In November 2024, the commission formally recommended in its annual report that Congress revoke China's permanent normal trade relationship status. In 2025, it issued another report urging the government to strengthen export controls and improve sanctions policies against China.
In reality, this is an organization that specifically devises strategies to suppress China.
Such an organization departed for China on July 18th. Chairman Randall Schriver stated before departure: "This trip is not to restart bilateral relations, but to understand them."
The delegation specifically requested meetings with leading Chinese companies in fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and biotechnology. Vice Chairman Quinn complained directly after the visit: "Meetings with many leading Chinese technology companies were not secured."
Why were Chinese technology companies not included? Simon, an analyst who has long studied Chinese technology, put it bluntly: "This commission is a policy participant, not a neutral fact-finding body." David Zhang, an analyst at another Washington policy organization, put it more bluntly: For Chinese tech companies, sitting down with members of the US committee at this juncture means any statement they make could appear in the annual report and become grounds for the next round of restrictions.
An organization that consistently recommends strengthening technology restrictions on China, an organization that pushes to revoke China's permanent normal trade relations status, and an organization that urges the government to strengthen export controls and sanctions—all of these organizations came to China specifically to meet with the most core tech companies. Were they there to gather information or to collect intelligence?
The Chinese side handled it very clearly. During the delegation's visit to China, they met with diplomats from the US Embassy in China, some Chinese government officials, local think tanks, and representatives from companies in both China and the US. Want to meet with top Chinese tech companies? No way.
Quicken complained, "This in itself is a data point." He's right. It tells the Americans that coming with hostility will not get them what they want. Before the delegation even returned home, Quicken was already complaining to the media. After the visit, he declared, "I am committed to returning to China at least once a year." Being snubbed yet still coming every year—isn't that just being stubborn? II. Reviving Projects Exposes Internal Divisions
Around the time of this delegation's visit to China, the Associated Press obtained internal documents from the U.S. State Department and congressional notifications.
The documents show the project's scale is divided into three parts: $175.8 million for replacing undersea communication cables in the Caribbean and Central America, a project simply named "Countering China's Control of Caribbean and Central American Undersea Cables Project"; over $340 million allocated to more than 50 specific anti-China projects globally, focusing on the Western Hemisphere, including establishing security operations centers in Argentina and Belize to monitor Chinese overseas projects, restarting projects in South American countries to prevent Chinese "infiltration," and developing proprietary communication technology to interfere in Tibetan affairs; and an additional nearly $500 million in investment to build a counter-network in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Asia.
The three parts combined far exceed $500 million, equivalent to over 3.6 billion yuan.
But the numbers themselves are not the most noteworthy aspect. The vast majority of these projects were already canceled last year. They were canceled by the "Department for Government Efficiency" led by Musk. At the time, Musk led this department in a "downsizing" of the federal government, laying off staff, cutting budgets, and closing agencies. The U.S. Agency for International Development was dismantled, and numerous previously approved projects related to China were completely halted.
Last year, he personally cut them off; this year, they've all been revived. This act of cutting and then reviving exposes the deep divisions within U.S. policy towards China. On one side, some believe in containing China at all costs; on the other, others believe these projects are a waste of taxpayer money. Last year, Musk's actions gave the latter side the upper hand. This year, with these projects revived, the former's influence has overwhelmed the latter.
Policies change arbitrarily, projects are cut and started just as easily. This isn't strategic resolve; it's internal strife. How can a country that can't even manage its own internal affairs think it can use money to subdue China? The more crucial question is, are these projects even useful?
II. Reviving Projects Exposes Internal Divisions
Around the time of this delegation's visit to China, the Associated Press obtained internal documents from the U.S. State Department and congressional notifications.
The documents reveal three main project segments: $175.8 million for replacing submarine communication cables in the Caribbean and Central America, a project aptly named "Countering China's Control over Caribbean and Central American Submarine Cables"; over $340 million allocated to more than 50 specific anti-China projects globally, primarily in the Western Hemisphere, including establishing security operations centers in Argentina and Belize to monitor Chinese overseas projects, restarting projects in South American countries to prevent Chinese "infiltration," and developing proprietary communication technologies to interfere in Tibetan affairs; and an additional nearly $500 million to build a counter-network in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Asia.
These three segments combined far exceed $500 million, equivalent to over 3.6 billion yuan.
However, the numbers themselves are not the most noteworthy aspect. The vast majority of these projects were cancelled last year. They were cancelled by Musk's "Department for Government Efficiency." At the time, Musk led this department in a "downsizing" of the federal government, laying off staff, cutting budgets, and closing agencies; the U.S. Agency for International Development was dismantled, and numerous previously approved projects related to China were completely halted.
What was personally cancelled last year has been revived this year. This back-and-forth action has laid bare the deep divisions within the US regarding its China policy. On one hand, some believe in containing China at all costs; on the other, others see these projects as a waste of taxpayer money. Last year, with Musk's decisive move, the latter voice prevailed. This year, with these projects reviving, the former's influence has overwhelmed the latter.
Policies change arbitrarily, projects are cut or started just as quickly. This isn't strategic resolve; it's internal strife. How can a country that can't even manage its own internal affairs think it can use money to subdue China? More importantly, are these projects even effective?
IV. China Has No Reason to Be Set Up The US is sending people to investigate and pouring money into projects. It seems aggressive. But where's the loophole? The loophole is that $1.2 billion in bad debt. How big of a scheme can a country that can't even explain where its money went be?
More importantly, these projects target normal cooperation between China and developing countries. The US wants to use money to "replace" China's infrastructure investment and "block" China's technological cooperation. However, developing countries' choices are based on cost, quality, and actual needs, not on who pays the most. You spend $175.8 million on a single cable, while China may have already built three in another country. How long can the US sustain this money-spending race?
The US policy towards China is being dragged down by its own internal contradictions. On the one hand, it wants to contain China, but on the other hand, it is unwilling to truly invest sustainably. Canceling projects last year and reviving them this year—this back and forth is itself a drain on strategic resources. The news of the full restart of anti-China projects precisely exposes the biggest weakness of the US policy towards China: it cannot even integrate its own internal forces, yet it wants to integrate global forces to contain China.
China's judgment on this is clear. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson responded crisply on July 28: China's cooperation with relevant countries and regions is not about courting or confronting anyone, but about jointly safeguarding world peace and promoting global development. This means, you build your small circle, I'll promote my global cooperation. Two paths, let's see who goes further.
China isn't falling into the trap set by the US, not because it doesn't see it, but because it does and knows it will fall apart on its own. When hawks arrive, those who should be met will be met, and those who shouldn't will not. Projects are revived; those that should be opposed will be opposed, and those that should be cooperated on will continue to cooperate. It's that simple. That $1.2 billion mess is right there; the US should first settle its own accounts before talking about how to contain China.
